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INTRODUCTION

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)1 prohibits employment decisions that discriminate against people aged
forty to seventy2 because of their age.3 An exception to the ADEA
permits otherwise unlawful age discrimination when age is a "bona
fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business. ' '4 To invoke this exception successfully, an employer must produce evidence from
which a court can conclude that age is a valid BFOQ.5 Currently,
some confusion exists as to whether an employer's evidence must
establish that age is relevant to the performance of the employee's
1. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
621-634 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as ADEA].
2. Id. § 631(a).
3. Id. § 623(a)-(e).
4. Id. § 623(f)(1).
5. EEOC Interpretive Guidelines for the ADEA, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1625.1-1625.20,
1625.6(b) (1984) [hereinafter cited as EEOC Guidelines].

§§

1345

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1345

specific duties or whether this evidence need relate only to the general business of which the employee is a part.' The resolution of
this issue will determine the scope of the BFOQ exception.
In addressing this issue three circuit courts" have each proposed a different analysis. In EEOC v. City of Janesville' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted an
expansive view of the exception, requiring evidence of age as a
BFOQ to relate to the generic class of law enforcement personnel
rather than to the employee's specific duties as chief of police. Two
years later, in EEOC v. City of St. Paul9 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached a contrary result, requiring an employer to establish a BFOQ for the employee's specific
occupation as district fire chief rather than a BFOQ relating to the
generic class of firefighters as a whole. In 1984, in Mahoney v.
Trabucco'10 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits' approaches
and adopted an intermediate position. The First Circuit agreed
with the Eighth Circuit that an "occupational qualification" can be
separate from a "particular business" under narrow conditions,
thus requiring evidence of a BFOQ to relate to the employee's specific occupation."- The First Circuit, however, narrowly defined
those cases concerning separate occupations and finding no separate occupation in this particular case, accepted evidence of age as
a BFOQ for the generic class of protective service employees. 12
The purpose of this Recent Development is to determine
which approach best effectuates the purpose of the BFOQ exception. Part II examines the history of the ADEA and the judicial
application of the BFOQ exception. Part III discusses the three recent cases and their proposed tests for applying the BFOQ excep6. This issue does not arise frequently. Thus far, courts have addressed this problem only in cases concerning protective service employees-law enforcement personnel
and firefighters. In these areas the duties and demands of the job differ greatly between
the administrative personnel (police chief, fire chief) and those in more active duty.
The question therefore arises whether evidence of a BFOQ should relate to the duties
of the specific job or "occupation," or to the "particular business."
7. Mahoney v. Trabucco, 574 F. Supp. 955 (D. Mass. 1983), rev'd, 738 F.2d 35
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984); EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp.
1135 (D. Minn. 1980), afl'd, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. City of Janesville,
480 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Wis. 1979), rev'd, 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
8. 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
9. 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982).
10. 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984).
11. Id. at 38-39.
12. Id. at 39.
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tion. Part IV analyzes these tests in light of other judicial precedent, the wording of the BFOQ exception, and the ADEA's
legislative history. Part V concludes that the proper BFOQ test
should focus on the requirements of the employee's specific job
rather than the generic class of employees of which the employee is
a part.
II.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Age Discriminationin Employment Act

Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) in 196713 in response to the Secretary of Labor's study of
age discrimination in employment.1 4 The purpose of the ADEA is
to encourage employment of older workers by prohibiting discriminatory treatment based on stereotyped assumptions about the effects of aging on job performance.1 5 As originally enacted, the
ADEA applied to employers, 16 employment agencies, and labor
organizations,"8 and the ADEA protected individuals between the
ages of forty and sixty-five.' 9 Subsequent amendments broadened
the scope of the ADEA. The 1974 amendments expanded the definition of "employer" to include state and local governments, 0 and
the 1978 amendments extended the ADEA's protection to individuals up to seventy years of age.2
To accomplish its goals, the ADEA prohibits discrimination by
13. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982)).
14. Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 directed the Secretary of Labor to
examine the problem of age discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1970)
(amended 1972). For a brief discussion of the Secretary's findings, see Note, The Age
Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L. REv. 380, 383-84 (1976).
15. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982). An additional goal of the ADEA is to facilitate interaction between employers and workers concerning joint resolution of the
problems that accompany aging in the workplace. Id.
16. Id. § 623(a). "Employer" is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees. . . ." Id. § 630(b).
17. Id. § 623(b). "Employment agency" is defined in § 630(c).
18. Id. § 623(c). "Labor organization" is defined in § 630(d)-(e).
19. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976) (amended 1978).
20. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 55, 74 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2)
(1982)). Section 633a governs employment by the federal government. 29 U.S.C. § 633a
(1982). In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), the United States Supreme Court
held that the 1974 amendments, which required compliance with the ADEA by state
and local governments as employers, were constitutional.
21. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. III 1979)).
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an employer against a person because of that person's age.2 2 Specifically, an employer may not make either hiring or firing decisions based solely on age.2 3 An employer also may not limit the
employee's opportunities, wages, or status on the basis of age.24
The ADEA, however, provides for several limited exceptions, 25 the
most important of which is the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) exception. 26 The BFOQ exception frees employers from
otherwise valid charges of age discrimination when age is a demonstrably necessary occupational qualification of the employer's business. Once an employee demonstrates discrimination based on2
age, the employer then must attempt to establish a valid BFOQ. 1
If the employer successfully demonstrates that age is a BFOQ for a
job, he need not follow the general rule of individual analysis based
on ability29 and may impose a rigid age requirement for that job.30
Recognizing that frequent use of this exception would emasculate the ADEA and enable employers to make decisions solely on
the basis of age, the ADEA's enforcement agencies 31 have indicated
22. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(e) (1982).
23. Id. § 623(a)(1).
24. Id. § 623(a)(1)-(2). In addition, an employer violates the ADEA if he acts
against an employee or prospective employee in retaliation for questioning a discriminatory practice or for participating in an ADEA claim. Id. § 623(d). Nor can an employer use advertisements that encourage discrimination. Id. § 623(e).
25. Section 623(f) lists the exceptions to the ADEA. It is not unlawful:
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited . . . where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business [the BFOQ exception], or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age;
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee
benefit plan . . .; or
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
Id. § 623(f). For a discussion of the ameliorating effect of the exceptions on the achievement
of the ADEA's goals, see Rosenblum, Age Discriminationin Employment and the Permissibility of Occupational Age Restrictions, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1261 (1981).
26. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982).
27. Id.
28. See EEOC Guidelines, supra note 5, § 1625.6(b). For a discussion of the burden of
proof in ADEA cases, see Schickman, The Strengths and Weaknesses of the McDonnell
Douglas Formula in Jury Actions Under the ADEA, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1239 (1981); Note,
supra note 14, at 388-99.
29. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2213, 2219-20; see also supra note 28.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982).
31. Congress originally charged the Department of Labor with enforcing the ADEA
and aiding in its interpretation. 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1967). See Note, supra note 14, at 381
(explaining the congressional choice to administer the ADEA through the Department of
Labor). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is now responsible for
carrying out these functions. 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1982).
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that this section is one of "limited scope and application" and,
therefore, to be construed narrowly.32 The only other guidance initially given by Congress mandated a case by case approach33 and
described two examples of possible BFOQs: special, limited occupational circumstances requiring an employee of a certain age and
a statutorily imposed mandatory retirement when necessary for
34
public safety.
B. Judicial Application of the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification Exception
1. Employer's Burden of Proof in Title VII Cases
Courts addressing BFOQ claims in ADEA cases have followed
the BFOQ test set forth in cases arising under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964"5 for two reasons. First, the Civil Rights
Act and the ADEA share the same purpose of prohibiting discrimination,3 and second, Title VII contains a BFOQ exception similar
to the one in the ADEA.3 The BFOQ test that has emerged from
Title VII cases combines the results of two decisions from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit-Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company" and Diaz v.
Pan American World Airways. 9
32. Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin on the ADEA, 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.1860.120, 860.102(b) (1984) [hereinafter cited as Department Bulletin]; EEOC Guidelines,
supra note 5, § 1625.6(b).
33. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2213, 2220.
34. Department Bulletin, supra note 32, § 860.102(b). For example, a play requiring a
youthful characterization would be a special occupational circumstance requiring an employee of a certain age. Id. This bulletin, however, did not specify situations in which
mandatory retirement would be necessary for public safety.
35. See, e.g., Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1270 n.11 (4th Cir. 1977); Hodgson v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Note, supra note 14
(suggesting that an "automatic application of Title VII precedents" is inappropriate in
ADEA cases).
36. For a general discussion of employment discrimination and Title VII, see Developments in the Law-Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1113-19 (1971).
37. The BFOQ exception in Title VII states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ...
on the basis
of [their] religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex,
or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
38. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
39. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
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In Weeks the plaintiff submitted a bid to her employer for the
job of switchman. 40 Her employer refused to consider her application because the company had decided not to assign women employees to that job. 41 The plaintiff sued her employer for allegedly
violating Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. 42 The
employer admitted the violation, but asserted that being male was
a BFOQ for the job of switchman. 43 The employer produced evidence that the job required routine lifting of heavy equipment, ir44
regular working hours, and strenuous work during emergencies.
According to the court, the employer did not meet its burden
of proving a BFOQ defense merely by showing that the job was
"strenuous. '45 The court relied on Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) guidelines, 46 which require employers to consider individuals on the basis of their individual abilities rather
than on "stereotyped characterizations. '47 The Fifth Circuit enunciated the following test for demonstrating a BFOQ: "[A]n employer has the burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to
believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the duties of the job involved. '48 In a footnote that has become an
essential part of the Weeks test, the court noted that in some situations it might be "impossible or highly impractical to deal with
women on an individualized basis. '49 In such a case, the court postulated that the employer may be allowed to apply a "reasonable
' 50
general rule.
5
In Diaz 1 the Fifth Circuit added a threshold requirement to
the application of the BFOQ exception. In the Diaz case the airline-employer refused to hire the plaintiff as a flight cabin attend40. 408 F.2d at 230.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 231-32.
44. Id. at 234.
45. Id.
46. The EEOC is responsible for enforcing the Civil Rights Act. 29 U.S.C. § 628
(1982).
47. 408 F.2d at 235 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1(a)(1)).
48. 408 F.2d at 235.
49. Id. at 235 n.5. The court indicated that this exception did not apply to the present
case because testing each female applicant's lifting ability would be easy. Id.
50. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 78-79 (discussing Fifth Circuit's further
clarification of this part of the Weeks test). Subsequent Title VII and ADEA cases have
adopted the dicta in this footnote as a second prong of the Weeks test. See infra notes 82-83
and accompanying text.
51. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
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ant because he was male.52 Demonstrating both that female cabin
attendants generally were better at meeting the psychological
needs of the passengers than males 53 and that passengers preferred

female attendants, the employer claimed that being female was a
BFOQ for the job of cabin attendant.5 4 According to the court, the
BFOQ exception set forth a "business necessity test, not a business convenience test."55 The court, therefore, rejected the airline's
BFOQ claim, stating that a BFOQ is valid only "when the essence
of the business operation would be undermined" by not following
the discriminatory hiring practice. 6
2. Employer's Burden of Proof in ADEA Cases
The first ADEA case requiring a court to consider the BFOQ
exception came before the Seventh Circuit in 1974. In Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc.5 the Secretary of Labor alleged that the
busline's maximum age hiring policy for intercity bus drivers violated the ADEA. 58 The busline claimed that age was a BFOQ be-

cause of public safety considerations." To establish this claim the
busline produced medical evidence of the effects of aging on driving,60 descriptions of the rigors of the job performed by new drivers,"1 and safety statistics of drivers indicating the most safe com52. Id. at 386.
53. Id. at 387. The court quoted the trial court's finding that females were better at
performing the "non-mechanical aspects" of the job: "providing reassurance to anxious passengers, giving courteous personalized service and, in general, making flights as pleasurable
as possible within the limitations imposed by aircraft operations." Id. (quoting 311 F. Supp.
559, 563 (S.D. Fla. 1970)). The court characterized these benefits in addition to "the obvious
cosmetic effect that female stewardesses provide," which was not noted explicitly by the
lower court, as important but tangential. 442 F.2d at 388.
54. 442 F.2d at 386-87.
55. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original).
56. Id. (emphasis in original).
57. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
58. 499 F.2d at 860. The busline refused to consider any applications from persons
aged thirty-five or older. Id. The Government claimed that this policy violated multiple
sections of the ADEA: 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)()-for refusal to hire because of age;
§ 623(a)(2)-for detrimentally affecting an employee's opportunities or status because of his
age; and § 623(e)-for discriminatory advertisements. 499 F.2d at 860.
59. 499 F.2d at 861.
60. Id. at 863-64. The busline's evidence described general degenerative changes that
take place in the process of aging. Id. Typically, this type of general evidence of aging is
unpersuasive to courts. See, e.g., Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743 (7th
Cir. 1983); EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1982); Aaron v. Davis,
414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
61. 499 F.2d at 864.
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bination of age and driving experience. 2 The district judge,
applying the Weeks test," held that the busline had failed to establish a BFOQ. s4 The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed and refused to apply the Weeks test to this evidence, stating that Weeks
did not address situations with strong public safety concerns.6 5
The court found the Diaz test s to accommodate the safety factor
better.6 7 Because safe transportation of passengers was the essence
of the busline's business, the court required that the employer
have only a "rational basis in fact" to support his belief that the
questioned hiring policy furthered the goal of public safety.6 8 According to the court, the busline had met this lessened burden and,
69
therefore, had established age as a valid BFOQ.
Two years after Greyhound, the Fifth Circuit addressed an almost identical fact situation in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc.7 0 The Secretary of Labor instituted this suit against the busline because of its maximum age hiring practice.7 1 In evaluating
the busline's claim of a BFOQ defense, the court confronted the
question of what standard to apply.7 2 According to the court, the
Seventh Circuit had misunderstood Diaz and had wrongfully rejected the Weeks test.73 The Fifth Circuit clarified the Diaz test,
stating that the "essence of the business" requirement is a "condi62. Id. at 864-65.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
64. 499 F.2d at 861.
65. Id. at 861-62.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
67. 499 F.2d at 862. The Fifth Circuit later questioned the Seventh Circuit's analysis
of Diaz. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75. Because Diaz dealt with an aspect of the
job that was clearly peripheral to the employer's business of safe air transportation of passengers, the Fifth Circuit in Diaz merely enunciated an important thresholdrequirement to
claiming a BFOQ. Had this initial criterion been met in Diaz, the Diaz court would have
required the further standard of proof set forth in Weeks. In Greyhound the Seventh Circuit only required the employer to meet this threshold criterion before rubber-stamping the
employer's claim of age as a BFOQ. See generally Comment, The Scope of the Bona Fide
Occupational QualificationExemption Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act,
57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1145, 1150-54 (1981). Other circuits have not followed the Greyhound
court's approach. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
68. 499 F.2d at 863.
69. Id. at 861, 865. The court added that the busline's policy was based on a "good
faith judgment" and was "not the result of an arbitrary belief lacking in objective reason or
rationale." Id. at 865.
70. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
71. Id. at 226-27. The bus company considered applications for initial employment
only from persons aged twenty-five to forty. Id. at 227.
72. Id. at 233-34.
73. Id. at 234-35.
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tion precedent" to applying the Weeks test and not an exception
to Weeks.7 4 The Fifth Circuit also asserted that proper application
of the Weeks-Diaz test should account adequately for safety
75
considerations.
Applying this test to the Tamiami case, the court found that
the busline had established age as a BFOQ.76 As the busline's concern was for public safety-clearly the essence of its business-the
busline satisfied the Diaz requirement." In applying Weeks, the
court'clarified the second prong of the Weeks test,7 ' stating that an
employer could demonstrate that it is impossible or highly impractical to use an individualized approach by showing that "some
members of the discriminated-against class possess a trait precluding safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained
by means other than knowledge of the applicant's membership in
the class."'79 The court found that the district court could have
concluded from the medical testimony that the busline had met
this prong of the test.8 0 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, affirmed the
finding of a BFOQ exception.81
The Weeks-Diaz test set forth in Tamiami has become the
standard approach in both Title VIP 2 and ADEA cases. 8 3 The
EEOC also has adopted the test,8 4 requiring the employer first to
meet the Diaz "essence of the business" test and then to satisfy
either prong of the Weeks test by showing a factual basis for be74. Id. at 235 n.27.
75. Id. at 235-36. According to the court, the Diaz element adjusts to encompass the
safety factor-"the greater the safety factor,. . . the more stringent may be the job qualifications designed to insure safe driving." Id. at 236.
76. Id. at 237-38.
77. Id. at 236.
78. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
79. 531 F.2d at 235.
80. Id. at 236-38.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
83. Of the circuits that have addressed this issue, the following circuits have adopted
the Weeks-DiazlTamiami approach: First Circuit-Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984); Fourth Circuit-Smallwood v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982); Fifth Circuit-EEOC
v. University of Tex. Health Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1983); Sixth Circuit-Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying a slight variation of
Tamiami); Seventh Circuit-Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 484 (1984); Eighth Circuit-Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Ninth Circuit-EEOC v.
County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1982); District of Columbia Circuit-Stewart v. Smith, 673 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
84. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 5, § 1625.6(b).
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lieving that substantially all members of a certain age group could
not perform the job satisfactorily or that membership in a certain
age group is the only practical means of determining whether an
individual could perform the job satisfactorily.8 5 While the WeeksDiaziTamiami test is well established, courts recently have disagreed over a new issue concerning the proper application of the
BFOQ defense. The recent cases that follow illustrate this new aspect of the continuing judicial development of the BFOQ test.
III.
A.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT

EEOC v. City of Janesville

The 1980 case of EEOC v. City of Janesville 6 presented the
Seventh Circuit with a new issue concerning judicial evaluation of
an asserted BFOQ defense. The EEOC claimed that the City of
Janesville, Wisconsin had violated the ADEA by discharging the
chief of police when he reached the age of fifty-five. 7 The City had
relied upon the Wisconsin Retirement Fund statutes8 that required
mandatory retirement of all protective service employees 9 at age
fifty-five. According to the City, the statute evidenced the legislature's judgment that age was a BFOQ for all protective service

jobs.90
Having found the prima facie elements of age discrimination
present, the district judge examined the likelihood of the City's
85. Strong safety considerations are another factor that may affect the standard of
proof. See, e.g., Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (applying
the Diaz test in a fashion similar to the Seventh Circuit's approach in Greyhound), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). At least one court has relied on federal age restrictions for
certain classes of federal employees as conclusive evidence of a BFOQ. See Johnson v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 731 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court,
however, has found this reliance to be improper. See Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 105 S. Ct. 2717 (1985); see also Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d
743 (7th Cir. 1983) (federal age requirements not persuasive), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 484
(1984).
86. 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
87. Id. at 1256. Kenneth Jones, the discharged police chief, brought the original civil
suit against the City (case number 79-C-477) claiming violations of the ADEA, the Civil
Rights Act, and the 5th and 14th amendments to the Constitution. EEOC v. City of Janesville, 480 F. Supp. 1375, 1376 n.1 (W.D. Wis. 1979). The EEOC brought this separate action
before the district court against the City and the State to enforce Jones' ADEA claim. Id. at
1376.
88. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 41.01-.60 (West 1979). The Wisconsin Public Employees Retirement Act sets up a retirement fund for protective service employees. 480 F. Supp. at 1377.
89. The Seventh Circuit opinion noted that the statute's definition of protective ser.vice employees included the chief of police. See 630 F.2d at 1258.
90. 480 F. Supp. at 1377.
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success in proving a BFOQ defense in order to rule on the EEOC's
request for a preliminary injunction. 91 In applying the words of the
BFOQ exception, the district judge focused on the police chief's
specific duties. The district judge stated that a court can gauge the
effects of aging only by "addressing precisely the particular activities of a particular employee or category of employees. "92 According to the district judge, the City's approach of focusing on protective service employees as a class was contrary to congressional
intent as evidenced in the ADEA.as Because the City's only evidence of a BFOQ related to the generic class of protective service
employees,"' the district judge found that the City probably would
not be able to demonstrate a BFOQ for police chiefs after a full
trial on the merits. 5 The district judge, therefore, granted the
EEOC's request for a preliminary injunction requiring reinstatement.96
On appeal the Seventh Circuit considered whether evidence of
a BFOQ must relate to the specific duties of the police chief or to
the generic duties of all protective service employees. 97 According
to the court, the district judge's interpretation of the BFOQ exception, which required the court to look at the employee's specific
duties, was excessively restrictive. 98 The court stated that an examination of the legislative history of the ADEA was unnecessary, 99
relying instead on the "plain meaning of the term 'particular business.'

",0o

According to the Seventh Circuit, the City need only

91. Id. at 1377-78.
92. Id. at 1378. The district judge went on to say- "The effect of the ages of all of the
members of the department upon the normalcy of the department's operation cannot be
gauged by addressing only the particular activities of the patrol officers." Id.
93. Id. at 1379.
94. The district court noted that the City had no evidence of its own to support any
claim of a BFOQ. Rather, the City relied exclusively upon reports of Wisconsin's Retirement
Research Committee to support the City's general BFOQ claim. Id. at 1377, 1379-80. The
court found this general evidence irrelevant to establishing a BFOQ for the job of chief of
police. Id. at 1380.
95. Id. at 1380-81.
96. Id. at 1381.
97. 630 F.2d at 1254. On appeal the City claimed that the trial judge had abused his
discretion by issuing the injunction and that the ADEA's applicability to state and local
governments violated the 10th amendment. Id. at 1256. The Seventh Circuit found that
issue to be properly addressed at trial by the district court. Id. at 1259. The United States
Supreme Court later found that the 1974 amendments making the ADEA apply to state and
local governments were constitutional. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
98. 630 F.2d at 1258.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court stated, "Congress was certainly at liberty to limit the applicability
of a BFOQ to a particular 'occupation' rather than to a 'business' if it so intended." Id.
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demonstrate at trial that age was a BFOQ for "the generic class of
employees subject to its retirement program." 10 1 Based on this interpretation of the BFOQ defense, the Seventh Circuit reversed
02
the district judge's grant of the injunction.
B. EEOC v. City of St. Paul
In EEOC v. City of St. Paul'03 the Eighth Circuit addressed
the same issue as the Seventh Circuit in Janesville. The City of St.
Paul retired a district fire chief pursuant to both a Minnesota statute and a St. Paul ordinance that provided for the mandatory retirement of all fire department personnel at age sixty-five. 104 The
EEOC filed suit on the fire chief's behalf to enforce his rights
under the ADEA. 105
To determine whether age was a BFOQ defense to this action'0 6 the district court examined the duties of firefighters, fire
captains, 10 7 and district chiefs. 08 The district court found that the
district chiefs primary duties included supervising, handling disciplinary problems, and training. 0 9 Moreover, only occasionally did
district chiefs take an active role in fire suppression. 10 The court
also looked at both the effects of aging on the performance of the
duties of each job"' and the efficacy of testing to discover individuals' actual abilities to perform the duties of their jobs. 12 Based on
this extensive analysis, the court concluded that being sixty-four or
younger was a BFOQ for the jobs of firefighters and fire captains. 13 Applying the two-part Weeks test" 4 to the position of dis101. Id. (emphasis in original).
102. Id. at 1257.
103. 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982).
104. EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. 1135, 1137-38 (D. Minn. 1980).
105. Id. at 1138. Initially, both the City of St. Paul and the State of Minnesota were
defendants in this action. The court dismissed the State as a defendant, however, because
the court found that the State had no plan to enforce the statute against the fire chief. Id.
at 1143-44.
106. Id. at 1137.
107. Id. at 1138-40. According to the court, the duties of firefighters and fire captains
include rescuing the persons endangered by the fire, moving heavy equipment to the scene
of the fire, suppressing the fire, and clearing the scene after extinguishing the fire. Id.
108. Id. at 1139-40.
109. Id. at 1139.
110. Id. at 1140.
111. Id. at 1140-41.
112. Id. at 1141-43.
113. Id. at 1143-45.
114. The court did not identify this test by name, but applied the same standards
found in the Weeks test. See id. at 1145.
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trict chief, however, the court found that the City did not have a
"factual basis for believing that substantially all District Chiefs are
unable to perform their duties safely and effectively after the age
of 64." 115 Nor did the City establish the impossibility of ascertaining, without knowing the employees' ages, whether some district
chiefs possessed traits making safe, effective performance impossible." The district court, therefore, concluded that being sixty-four
1 17
or younger was not a BFOQ for the job of district fire chief.
On appeal" 8 the City argued that the district judge erred in
looking at the district chief's specific duties to determine whether
age was a BFOQ. 9e Instead, the City argued that the court should
follow the Seventh Circuit's approach in Janesville and require evidence of a BFOQ to relate to all firefighting personnel as a class. 2 0
The Eighth Circuit refused to adopt the Seventh Circuit's approach, finding it "inconsistent with the goal of ability-based decisions to allow a city to retire a fire chief or a police chief who was
completely able to fulfill his duties because he was unable to fulfill
the duties of another position within the department."'' While
the Seventh Circuit emphasized the words "particular business" to
support its conclusion that the ADEA did not contemplate evidence of a particular occupation within a business, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the language of the BFOQ exception differently.
The Eighth Circuit examined the rest of the words in the BFOQ
exception, including "bona fide occupational qualification," and
concluded22 that age must be relevant to an occupation within a
business.
The Eighth Circuit noted other problems with the Seventh
Circuit's approach, including its inconsistency with the congressional intent behind the ADEA, the potential of frustrating the entire purpose of the ADEA by broadening the scope of the BFOQ
defense, and the difficulty of defining the "generic class" in order
to apply the test. 2 3 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's
115. Id.
116. Id.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1146.
EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1165.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).

123. Id. at 1165-66. For an in-depth discussion of Janesville,see Comment, supra note
67; Casenote, EEOC v. City of Janesville: Promoting Age Discrimination-TheException
Becomes the Rule, 14 J. MA. L. REv. 895 (1981).
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approach, requiring evidence of a BFOQ to relate to the specific
duties of the district chief.'24 Examining the evidence in light of
this approach, the court found that the facts supported the district
court's holding that the City had failed to establish age as a BFOQ
for district chiefs
and, thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
1 25
court's result.

C. Mahoney v. Trabucco
In Mahoney v. Trabucco126 the First Circuit also addressed

the issue of the relevant class of employees for the purpose of establishing a BFOQ defense and proposed yet a third approach. In
Trabucco Massachusetts sought to retire127 a state police sergeant
in accordance with a Massachusetts statute requiring the retirement at age fifty of all uniformed members of the state police. 128
The Sergeant sued the Commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety, claiming that applying the mandatory retirement statute in
his case violated the ADEA. 129 The Commonwealth asserted that
30
age was a BFOQ for all uniformed members of the state police.

The district court identified the Weeks-Diaz/Tamiami approach
as the proper test for establishing a BFOQ defense.' 3 1 Finding that
the retirement statute was related to the essence of the job of the
Massachusetts State Police, 13 2 the district court went on to ex-

amine whether the Commonwealth had met the second part of the
test. ' In order to determine whether substantially all persons
older than fifty would be unable to perform the duties of the job or
that individual testing would not indicate whether persons older
than fifty could effectively perform the duties of the job,' 3 the district judge recognized the important threshold question of how to
define the duties of the Sergeant's job.3 5
124. 671 F.2d at 1166.
125. Id. at 1168.
126. 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984).
127. With the consent of the parties the district court enjoined Mahoney's retirement
until trial on the merits. Mahoney v. Trabucco, 574 F. Supp. 955, 956 (D. Mass. 1983).
128. Id. at 956.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 957.
131. Id. at 958.
132. Id. This finding satisfied the Diaz part of the Weeks-DiaziTamiami test. See
supra text accompanying note 56.
133. 574 F. Supp. at 958.
134. This is the second prong of the Weeks-DiazlTamiami test. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50, 78-79.
135. 574 F. Supp. at 958.
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The Commonwealth contended that the Sergeant's duties
should be defined as the duties of all uniformed state policemen, 13 6
namely, patrolling state highways, assisting the public and police,
imposing order during state prison disturbances, and helping during natural disasters and emergencies. Based on the Commonwealth's evidence concerning these duties and medical evidence
about the effects of age on performing the duties,31 the district
judge concluded that age was a BFOQ for those duties.3 9 The Sergeant, however, argued that the court should examine the asserted
BFOQ defense in light of the duties of his particular job, which
differed greatly from the duties of most uniformed state policemen. "140 The Sergeant introduced evidence that he had worked at
the State Police General Headquarters as a telecommunications
specialist for fourteen years.141 The evidence indicated that, although subject to some of the same responsibilities as all uniformed state policemen, 142 the Sergeant's daily job routine differed
greatly, essentially amounting to a desk job.143 Even his duties dur-

ing emergencies had been confined largely to communications
duty. 144 Furthermore, the Commissioner testified that, although
the Sergeant was subject to transfer to a job involving road duty,
such a transfer would be unlikely in his case.1 45 Finally, medical
evidence indicated that age would not be a BFOQ for the duties of
46
the Sergeant's job.1

Faced with all this evidence, the district judge reviewed the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits' approaches to the same issue of stat136.

Id.

137. Id. at 959. The evidence indicated that two-thirds of the uniformed branch of
state policemen performed these duties. Id.
138. Id. at 959-60.
139. Id. at 960.
140. Id. at 958.
141. Id. at 959. The Sergeant's duties included training others in the uses of police
telecommunications, keeping and supplying certain criminal records, and serving as a state
police liaison to a civilian communications unit. Id.
142. As a uniformed member of the state police, the Sergeant was responsible to help
citizens in emergency situations on state highways, to take appropriate action if he saw a
crime taking place, and to be prepared to respond to an emergency. Id.
143. According to the court, the Sergeant's job was the same in essence as "an office
worker holding a desk job." The Sergeant worked regular office hours while most state police officers worked four days and then had two days off. Id.
144. Id.
145. The Commissioner stated that, because the Sergeant's job required technical
knowledge, he probably would not be reassigned unless his job performance was poor. Id. at
962.
146. Id. at 960.
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utory interpretation. 147 The district court chose to adopt the
Eighth Circuit's approach from St. Paul14 8 despite the potential
problems with this approach, 1 49 finding that it reflected sound stat150
utory interpretation and best effectuated the ADEA's policies.
The court concluded that evidence of a BFOQ defense should be
tested against "the requirements of the job that Sergeant Mahoney
has actually performed in the past and is likely to perform in the
future.'' The district court applied this test to the evidence and,
not finding that age was a BFOQ for the Sergeant's job, enjoined
the Commonwealth from enforcing the statute against the Ser52
geant as long as he worked at his current assignment.
On appeal 153 the First Circuit reversed, noting problems of
"morale, administration, litigation and adjudication" resulting
from the district court's approach.'" The court found that the
ADEA and congressional intent supported a different, less problematic approach. Agreeing with both the Eighth Circuit and the
district court in Trabucco that courts must ascribe meaning to "occupational qualification" as well as to "particular business,' ' 5 5 the
First Circuit defined occupation as a "recognized and discrete vocation.' 56 Disagreeing with the district court, the First Circuit
stated that assignments within a paramilitary uniformed force,
even if of long duration, would not constitute occupations. 157 The
147. Id. at 960-61.
148. See supra text accompanying note 124.
149. 574 F. Supp. at 962-63. For example, the court recognized that this approach
could favor those members of the uniformed branch of the state police whose duties did not
require top physical condition, thereby subjecting some, but not all, members of the uniformed branch to mandatory retirement at age fifty. Id.
150. Id. at 961.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 963.
153. Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984).
154. Id. at 38-39. The court noted that the district court's approach could create the
following problems: (1) administrative personnel within a strenuous occupation not being
subject to a BFOQ applicable to other personnel; (2) some personnel being unavailable for
general duty; (3) inconsistent treatment of officers of the same rank; (4) more difficult assignment decisions; (5) more incentive for employees to seek "safe harbor" positions;
(6) fewer promotions; (7) responsible employees being penalized; (8) increased litigation;
and (9) more intrusive quality judgments by the courts. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 39. The court cited Webster's definition of "occupation" as: "'The principal business of one's life: a craft, trade, profession or other means of earning a living...
Id. (quoting WEBsTSR's THiRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1560 (1966)).
157. 738 F.2d at 39. The court seemed to think it significant that all members of such
a force were subject to the same military training, unrestricted reassignment, and strenuous
emergency duties, and all received special disability and pension benefits. Id. Agreeing with
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First Circuit concluded that the language of the ADEA,158 congressional intent, 159 and relevant case law 60 supported the court's approach of giving meaning, but limited application, to the term
"occupation."

IV.

ANALYSIS

The three circuit courts that have addressed the issue of
whether an "occupational qualification" need relate only to the
general business of which the employee is a part or to the employee's specific duties within that business have taken three different positions. The Seventh Circuit maintains that the BFOQ
need pertain only to the duties of the generic class of personnel.
The Eighth Circuit holds the opposite view and requires that the
BFOQ relate to the duties of the particular position in question.
The First Circuit takes an intermediate stance, asserting that the
BFOQ need be relevant to the specific job only in those narrowly
defined situations in which genuinely distinct occupations exist
within a general group of employees. Proper resolution of this conflict is extremely important because the approach adopted will determine the scope of the BFOQ exception and, thus, the efficacy of
the ADEA in protecting the rights of many elderly employees. In
order to determine the appropriate conclusion, these three approaches must be evaluated in light of three considerations: (1)
prior judicial application of the BFOQ test in similar circumstances, (2) the words of the BFOQ exception, and (3) legislative
history as a manifestation of congressional intent.
Although previous ADEA cases did not explicitly address this
the Eighth Circuit to a limited extent, the court stated that the job of fire chief, such as the
one in St. Paul, was "arguably" an occupation. The First Circuit, however, went on to disa-

gree with the Eighth Circuit's willingness to consider other assignments as occupations. Id.
158. According to the court, its approach was consistent with the language of the
BFOQ exception because the court gave meaning to both occupation and particular business. Id. at 39.
159. Id. at 39-41. The court relied both on statements from the 1977 congressional
debate between Senators Williams and Javits and on a specific example, offered by Senator
Javits, of a possible BFOQ defense. Id. For a discussion of these statements, see infra text
accompanying notes 183-86.
160. 738 F.2d at 39-41. The court identified four cases that focused on the class of
employees and not on the exceptions. These cases, which arose prior to the 1977 debates,
are: Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974); Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976);
and McIlvanie v. Pennsylvania State Police, 6 Pa. Commw. 505, 296 A.2d 630 (1972). The
court also relied on language from EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). 738 F.2d at 41.
The persuasiveness of these cases is discussed infra text accompanying notes 162-64, 180-82.
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issue, earlier cases can give some indication of how other courts
might address the issue. This particular BFOQ issue does not arise
in the typical job situation in which an employee is hired to perform a specific job and may be promoted to a different job as he
progresses. In these cases, courts have always required evidence of
a BFOQ defense to relate to the employee's specific duties.16 ' The
issue of whether a BFOQ should relate to a specific job or to a
generic class only arises in situations in which the duties of different positions within a general group of employees may vary
greatly. In Aaron v. Davis,6 2 the only case arising prior to Janesville in which this issue is relevant, the district court examined the
BFOQ evidence in light of the employees' specific duties as assistant fire chief and district fire chief. By focusing on the exact duties each plaintiff performed, the court implied that evidence of a
BFOQ for the general class of firefighters was inadequate. 6 3 Al-

though not determinative, this past judicial precedent does yield
slight support for focusing on the individual employee's duties.""
The most important requirement for any statutory interpretation is that it conform with the language of the statute. A proposed
test for applying the BFOQ exception, therefore, must be consistent with the words of the BFOQ exception. The BFOQ exception
explicitly contemplates that the qualifications required by the employee's occupation also must be necessary within the larger
sphere of the particularbusiness. A proper interpretation of the
BFOQ exception, therefore, must give meaning to both "occupational qualification" and "particular business." To say, as the Seventh Circuit did in Janesville, that Congress' use of "particular
business" resolves the inquiry, placing the whole focus on the
"business" of law enforcement or firefighting,' 65 is inconsistent
161. In retirement cases, the employee's current duties provide the standard. See, e.g.,
Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 413 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd, 553 F.2d
561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977). In refusal to hire cases, the applicant's
potential duties are determinative. See, e.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224
(5th Cir. 1976).
162. 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
163. See Casenote, supra note 123, at 911-12.
164. After Janesville and St. Paul, the following courts outside of the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits addressed this issue and found as follows: EEOC v. University of Tex.
Health Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding St. Paul the proper approach); Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (cites Janesville's
district court opinion, which is the same as St. Paul, as the proper approach).
165. EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980). Courts and commentators have criticized Janesville for its statutory interpretation and other problems.
See, e.g., EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162, 1165-68 (8th Cir. 1982); Comment, supra
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with the very words of the statute the court purports to apply. The
Seventh Circuit's approach, therefore, is not a viable interpretation
of the BFOQ exception. The Eighth and First Circuits' approaches
both address the dual focus of the BFOQ exception, acknowledging
its recognition of separate occupations within the larger business.
These circuits, however, differ in the meaning they ascribe to "occupation," a difference that determines the scope of the BFOQ exception. In order to resolve this important conflict, both approaches must be examined in light of the third guide to proper
interpretation, legislative intent.
Although the legislative history of the ADEA is sparse and not
entirely lucid, examining the following sources provides guidance
in developing an appropriate clarification of the BFOQ test: interpretive statements by the ADEA's enforcement agency, an example of a possible BFOQ defense, and the general purpose of the
ADEA and its BFOQ exception. In 1968 the Department of Labor-the agency then charged with enforcing the ADEA and aiding
in its interpretation-issued an interpretive bulletin relating to the
BFOQ exception. 166 In 1981 the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which had taken over the Department of Labor's responsibilities of enforcing and interpreting the ADEA, issued a
similar interpretive bulletin with several very significant
changes. 16 7 The 1981 report incorporated the Weeks-Diazi
Tamiami test to describe the employer's burden in establishing a
BFOQ defense. 6 8 In addition, the 1981 report repeated a statement from the earlier report verbatim except for the important addition of four words: "Whether occupational qualifications will be
deemed to be 'bona fide' to a specific job and 'reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business,' will be determined on the basis of all the pertinent facts surrounding each
particular situation."'6 9 Thus, rather than requiring that an occupational qualification be bona fide and necessary only to the particular business, the added language means that the occupational
qualification must be necessary to the employee's job as well.
The example of a possible BFOQ defense given in the legislative history of the 1978 ADEA amendments also supports the idea
note 67, at 1147-48, 1165-78; Casenote, supra note 123, at 906-15.
166. Department Bulletin, supra note 32, § 860.102.
167. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 5, § 1625.6. The present version of § 1625.6 is similar to the cited version.
168. Id. § 1625.6(b).
169. Id. § 1625.6(a) (emphasis added).
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that a BFOQ should relate to the employee's specific job. The example states that the Weeks-DiaziTamiami test might be satisfied
"in certain types of particularly arduous law enforcement activity." 17

Clearly, this statement does not imply that all employees

engaged in the business of law enforcement would be subject to
such a BFOQ. Rather, the words "certain types of particularly arduous" limit those parts of law enforcement activity that would be
likely candidates for a valid BFOQ defense, necessitating an examination of the type of law enforcement activity in which the employee is engaged.
Finally, numerous statements by Congress, the Department of
Labor, and the EEOC clearly demonstrate four general interpretive guidelines. First, courts should construe the BFOQ exception
narrowly. 17 Second, courts should evaluate BFOQ claims on a case
by case basis.' 72 Third, courts should focus on the ability of the
elderly employee to perform his job effectively. 7 Last, courts must
accomplish the ADEA's purpose of ridding our nation of useless
age discimination. 174 All of these guidelines from the legislative
history indicate that the duties of the employee's specific job or
occupation are very relevant in determining a BFOQ. The Eighth
Circuit's approach in St. Paul, requiring evidence of a BFOQ to
relate to the individual employee's ability to do his individual job,
therefore, is most consistent with effectuating the ADEA's intended goals.
The First Circuit's approach in Trabucco also attempts to
comply with the guidelines set out in the legislative history. The
First Circuit's thoughtful opinion suggests a middle ground approach that attempts to balance the conflicting policy concerns of
the elderly employee, the employer, and the courts. The Trabucco
opinion offers persuasive arguments to support its restrictive interpretation of occupation. Although willing to acknowledge "recognized and discrete vocation[s]" as occupations, 17 5 the First Circuit
points out numerous problematic implications of considering an
employee's assignment within a uniformed, protective service force
170.

S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprintedin 1978 U.S.

CODE CONG.

&

AD. NEWS 504, 513-14.

171.

Department Bulletin, supra note 32, § 860.102(b).
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2220.
173. S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1978 U.S.
NEWS 504, 506.
174. Id.; EEOC Guidelines, supra note 5, § 1625.6.
175. Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35, 38-39 (1st Cir. 1984).

172. 1967 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD.
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to be an occupation. 17 6 The many problems that could impose burdens on employers and courts include restricting the assignability
of employees; treating employees of the same rank inconsistently;
interfering with existing pension programs, which are calculated on
the basis of retirement at a certain age; increasing litigation; and
forcing courts to make intrusive quality judgments. 177 According to
the First Circuit, because those problems are particularly prevalent
in employment situations within the protective service field, such
assignments should not be considered occupations for the purpose

of applying the BFOQ exception.'7 1
Admittedly, considering an assignment within a protective service force to be an occupation could create problems. The existence
of these problems, however, does not justify an analytical approach
that is inconsistent with the ADEA. The First Circuit asserts that
its narrow view of what constitutes an occupation is supported by
the ADEA. 17 9 To support this assertion the opinion lists four cases
decided prior to Janesville, stating that these cases demonstrate a
focus on the class of employees and not on exceptions within the
class.180 The First Circuit's reliance on these cases, however, is misplaced. For example, the issue is not relevant in two of the cases,
Tamiami and Greyhound, because they concern a failure to hire
employees to perform a discrete occupation. 8" Another case,
Aaron v. Davis, supports an individualized examination of the duties of the assistant fire chief and district fire chief for purposes of
demonstrating a BFOQ exception. 82
176. See supra note 154.
177. 738 F.2d at 38. An additional, unrecognized problem concerns the possibility of
manipulating an employee's retirement either by assigning him to a strenuous job for which
age is a BFOQ or by assigning him to an administrative job for which the same age is not a
BFOQ. Although this problem could occur, courts should be able to circumvent this problem
partially by using the approach suggested by the district court in Trabucco, which necessitates looking at the duties of the job the employee has performed in the past and is likely to
perform in the future. Mahoney v. Trabucco, 574 F. Supp. 955, 961 (D. Mass. 1983); see
infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
178. 738 F.2d at 39.
179. Id. at 39-42.
180. See cases cited supra note 160.
181. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of these cases, see
supra notes 57-81 and accompanying text.
182. Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976); see supra text accompanying
notes 162-63. The fourth pre-Janesville case noted was McIlvanie v. Pennsylvania State
Police, 6 Pa. Commw. 505, 296 A.2d 630 (1972). In this state case the court refused to focus
on the employee's specific duties as a troop commander within the state police and upheld
the employee's mandatory retirement. Id. This case provides some support for the First
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The First Circuit also relies on statements made in the congressional debate of the 1978 ADEA amendments for support. The
First Circuit, however, admitted that the speaker contradicted
himself and made statements "inconsistent with any concept of a
BFOQ."' 5 ' Understanding how the First Circuit could draw any
support from this source is difficult. The First Circuit also cites the
example of a BFOQ concerning "certain types of particularly arduous law enforcement activity.

'184

By restricting the BFOQ excep-

tion to only those specific aspects of law enforcement activity in
which increasing age truly will make job performance more difficult, however, this example provides more support for the Eighth
Circuit's view of "occupation.' 85 The example did not suggest that
there need be a "well-recognized occupation" as the First Circuit
maintains. 1 86 Because the First Circuit relied on unpersuasive

grounds and the legislative history supports the Eighth Circuit's
approach, the First Circuit opinion lacks any credible support.
Not only is the First Circuit's approach unsupported by the
ADEA's legislative history and relevant judicial precedent, but the
First Circuit's concerns about applying a broader interpretation of
occupation, although legitimate, are not persuasive in light of the
ADEA's policy objectives. The First Circuit's narrow view of occupation resulted in the mandatory retirement at age fifty of a state
police officer who had performed successfully as a telecommunications specialist for fourteen, years,'8 7 who was likely to remain in

that position until a later retirement date,

as

and who would most

Circuit's approach. But see supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (discussing cases
that suggest the Eighth Circuit's approach is more appropriate).
The First Circuit also relied on EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), a case in which
the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the ADEA's applicability to the states. The First Circuit drew support from dicta in the Court's opinion asserting
that the state could continue to enforce its retirement policy if it could demonstrate age as a
BFOQ for game wardens. Because the plaintiff was a game warden supervisor in the case,
the First Circuit thought the Court's reference to game wardens indicated the Supreme
Court's inclination to look at the generic class and not at the employee's specific duties.
Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 1984). This issue, however, was not before
the Supreme Court in the Wyoming case, and the entire context of the opinion indicates
that the Court probably did not consider this peripheral issue. The First Circuit's reference
to EEOC v. Wyoming, therefore, is not persuasive.
183. 738 F.2d at 40-41 (referring to the debate between Senators Williams and Javits).
184. Id. at 40, (citing S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 504, 513-14).
185. See supra text accompanying and following note 170.
186. See 738 F.2d at 42.
187. Id. at 37.
188. 574 F. Supp. at 962.
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likely have been able to perform his duties in that position effectively for many years after age fifty. 189 This result clearly frustrates
the intent of the ADEA and misuses the BFOQ exception to the
harm of both the employee and the employer by forcing the State
to find and train another person to perform the Sergeant's duties
when he could still perform them effectively.
In a different, less factually sympathetic case, the First Circuit's concerns for the employer and the courts may seem more
persuasive. However, this policy decision to balance inconvenience
to the employer and the courts against the needs of the older
worker is not a task for the courts. Congress, as the appropriate
body for weighing conflicting policy choices, has made its intent
clear through the ADEA. Congress has chosen to remedy the problem of past age discrimination by imposing some of the burden
previously borne by the older worker on the employer and the
courts. When interpreting this statute, courts must comply with
Congress' expressed intent. The broader interpretation of occupation enunciated by the Eighth Circuit in St. Paul, while problematic in some instances,19 0 does achieve Congress' intended result by
focusing on an individual's ability to perform his specific duties
effectively. Adopting the St. Paul approach, therefore, is the best
method of resolving the conflict over the proper focus of the BFOQ
test.
Finally, this new aspect of the BFOQ test must be integrated
into the judicial application of the BFOQ exception as a whole.
The district court in Trabucco adopted the St. Paul analysis and
demonstrated the proper place of this criterion in the application
of the BFOQ test. 191 First, the court must apply the Diaz test to
assure that the mandatory retirement age is related to the essential
function of the employer's business. Second, prior to applying the
Weeks test as clarified by Tamiami, the court must examine the
duties of the employee's job. If the job is a specific assignment, the
court should look at "the requirements of the job that [the employee] has actually performed in the past and is likely to perform
in the future."1 92 Finally, the court should apply the Weeks!
189. Id. at 960, 962.
190. See supra notes 154, 177.
191. 574 F. Supp. 955.
192. Id. at 961. The results of this inquiry may necessitate examining age as a BFOQ
for the generic class of employees rather than for the employee's specific duties if the employee has been or may be subject to diverse short-term assignments, some of which have
required or will require performance of strenuous activity. In these situations, therefore,
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Tamiami two-part test to those duties, requiring the employer to
demonstrate either that substantially all persons over the given age
cannot perform the duties of the job as defined above or that individual determinations of ability to perform the job are impossible
or impracticable.
This BFOQ test, incorporating St. Paul into the Weeks-Diazi
Tamiami test, truly effectuates the drafters' intent for the application of the ADEA's BFOQ exception. An employer will be able to
demonstrate a BFOQ defense when the employee's age actually interferes with his ability to do his job. When age is not a relevant
factor in the employee's ability to perform his duties, however, the
employer, the employee, and society will benefit by the employee's
continued work performance. Courts, therefore, should embrace
this approach as the most viable and effective expression of congressional intent.
V.

CONCLUSION

The issue recently addressed by the First, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits represents a new aspect of the continuing judicial
development of a BFOQ test. This issue, concerning whether evidence of a BFOQ defense should relate specifically to the actual
duties of the individual employee's job or to the duties of the generic class of employees of which the employee is a part, is resolved by careful examination of the ADEA and its legislative history. This inquiry reveals a preference for a restrictive construction
of the BFOQ exception, which requires the BFOQ evidence to relate to the employee's ability to perform the actual duties of his
job. Courts should adopt the approach first set forth by the Eighth
Circuit in St. Paul. This resolution of the current conflict among
the circuits will enable the BFOQ test as a whole to achieve its
proper function of allowing employers to make employment decisions based on empirical evidence of the effects of age on specific
job performance, but will prevent employers from misusing the
BFOQ exception as a means of circumventing the ADEA's
purposes.
JANE WELLS MAY

applying the Trabucco district court approach will require evidence to relate to the employee's specific duties only when his assignment actually approximates an occupation that
has some duration and particular duties.

